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Empathy and Compassion
Richard Warner∗
Can we know what another is feeling? Ask a nonphilosopher (and many a philosopher), and, if your
audience deigns to produce more than a pained
expression, the answer will be an impatient affirmation.
That—minus the impatience—is my answer too. Genuinely
questioning whether we can know what others think and
feel is a sign of insanity. Nonetheless, I contend that we
often think we know what another thinks and feels when
in fact we do not. Knowing how another thinks and feels
can be, and often is, a difficult achievement and our
efforts in this regard are often at best only partially
successful. Others are far more opaque to us than we may
suppose.
I approach this issue via the philosophical problem of
“other minds.”1 The version of the problem relevant here
is posed by presenting a seemingly valid argument
leading to the conclusion that we do not know that others
feel and experience as we do. The point is not to convince
anyone of a conclusion only an insane person would
believe. The point is to demonstrate that we lack an
adequate theoretical explanation of how we know about
the mental life of others. My primary interest in this
argument is two-fold. First, I present it to avoid confusion
by explicitly setting it aside as it is not the focus of my
concern. Second, I will use the style of argument, if not
the content, as a model for the two arguments that are
my central concern. The first of these arguments assumes
that we can know about the mental life of others but
© 2008 Richard Warner.
∗ Professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law; Visiting Foreign
Professor, Catholic University of Lublin, Poland; Visiting Foreign
Professor, University of Gdańsk, Poland. I have benefited greatly from
Claire Hill’s comments on earlier drafts.
1
. There are two “other minds” problems. The classic problem
argues that I do not know, and can never know, that others have a
mental life at all; they might, for all I know be robots devoid of any
mental activity. The other “other minds” problem I discuss assumes
others have a mental life but argues that we cannot know about their
feelings.
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argues that we often do not because of the possibility that
they are deceiving us. The second assumes that others
are on the whole truthful and argues that we still often
lack the background knowledge necessary to know about
important aspects of their mental lives.
It is essential to be clear about one point at the
outset. A remark by former Canadian Prime Minister Kim
Campbell illustrates the issue. In an attempt to empathize
with residents at a shelter in Vancouver’s Skid Row, she
told them that she too had felt loss and disappointment;
she had once, she explained, wanted to be a concert
cellist. The Prime Minister’s remark seems silly. But why?
She and the residents had felt disappointed, so, in that
sense, she had vicariously experienced what they felt. The
remark is silly because she claimed to know more than
just that they both had felt disappointed. She claimed to
know that her experience of disappointment at not
becoming a concert cellist was qualitatively the same (or
very closely similar to) the residents’ felt experience of
disappoint-ment. This seems silly to the extent that one
imagines the residents’ sense of loss and disappointment
having a depth, extent, and intensity unknown in the
Prime Minister’s experience. The most the Prime Minister
could know was that the residents’ felt experience was
enough like hers that both count as disappointments; but,
claiming to have vicariously experienced their feeling is a
bit like claiming to know what a shark looks like when gold
fish are all that one has ever seen. The Prime Minister’s
feelings belong to the same genus, so to speak, but not to
the same species.2 The point I wish to emphasize is that I
am concerned with our ability to know the “species.”
Empathy can give us such knowledge. The dictionary
defines empathy as “understanding, being aware of, being
sensitive to, and vicariously experiencing the feelings,
thoughts, and experience of another.”3 “Vicarious
2

. For an even more egregious example, imagine this response to
someone who has expressed to her friend her feelings of frustration,
weariness, isolation, and exasperation at raising a toddler. The
response: “I understand just how you feel. Having a dog is even more
demanding than having a kid.” Having a dog can make one feel
frustration, weariness, isolation, and exasperation, but, until you care
for a toddler, you really do not know what it can feel like. Again, the
friend’s feelings belong to the same genus, but not to the same species.
3
. Merriam Webster Online, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/empathy (last visited Mar. 13, 2008).
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experience” need not, but certainly can, reveal the
“species.” In this way, empathy can take us beyond just
knowing that our feelings and the feelings of others
belong to the same general category; it uses our feelings
to paint a portrait of another’s feelings in a way that
allows us to know the specific felt quality of the other’s
experience. We in turn want others to know the specific
felt qualities of our experiences. Such knowledge is one
basis of intimacy between friends, lovers, and spouses. I
contend, however, that we have such knowledge less
often than we think, and I argue that this fact should
make us more tolerant of others than we are.

I.

THE PROBLEM OF OTHER MINDS

The argument proceeds by describing a possibility and
then claiming that it poses an unanswerable challenge to
our knowledge claims. The possibility: imagine that there
was a nuclear holocaust in 1957 which created enough
worldwide radiation that the entire human population
eventually perished. Before the last survivors died,
however, an advanced race of benevolent aliens secretly
landed on earth. The aliens, conveniently immune to
radiation, surreptitiously harvested eggs from the last
survivors, used sperm banks to fertilize them, and buried
the frozen eggs deep in Montana. In 1975, the aliens
unthawed one egg as a test. You are the result.
Unfortunately, radiation levels were still so high that
managing your growth process was quite difficult;
consequently, the aliens decided to delay their next test
until 2030. To avoid the devastating psychological impact
of your discovering that you are the only non-alien on
earth, the aliens simply let you think they are all human
beings too. Their deception succeeds because they are
the product of an evolution that precisely parallels our
own. They are our cosmic twins. They look, act, and speak
exactly as we do; they have their own Shakespeare,
Keats, Einstein, and so on. They speak of hope, joy, pain,
gratitude, and the like just as we do, and those feelings
exhibit the same causal nexus as our feelings. What
causes joy in them is the same as what causes joy in us,
and the thoughts and actions joy causes in them are the
same as it causes in us. The difference is that the feeling
at the center of the causal nexus is not the same. The
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aliens’ neurophysiology is fundamentally different, with
the result that their felt experience is very different from
ours.4 When their Keats writes, “A thing of beauty is a joy
forever,” the joy he refers to has a very different felt
quality than the joy to which our Keats refers.
Possibilities of this type provide a seemingly
unanswerable challenge to our claims to know how
another feels. Consider an example. Suppose that, when
my grandmother dies, you think about me confronting her
death; and, as you imagine my reactions, you feel a
wrenching sense of loss. You infer that I feel the same.
The alien invasion possibility seems to show that you do
not know that I feel the same. To see why, consider an
analogy. As you are walking along a forest path, you see a
footprint. Two different species of animal, A’s and B’s,
leave exactly that footprint, and it is equally likely that it
was left by either (there are an equal number of A’s and
B’s in the forest). Do you know, on the basis of the
footprint alone, which animal left it? Of course not. To
know it is an A, you have to rule out the possibility it is a
B, and vice versa. You can do neither on the basis of the
footprint alone.
The wrenching grief example looks similar. The
“footprint” consists of everything you have observed
throughout your lifetime. This evidence cannot decide
between two hypotheses: I feel what you feel; or, I am an
alien with utterly different felt experiences. For all you
know, it is as likely that everyone else is an alien as it is
that everyone else is a human being. It appears then to
follow that you do not know that you and I are relevantly
similar, and hence that you do not know whether what
you feel is what I feel.
This is not to deny that you could know.5 You could cut
open my brain to see if my neurophysiology is human or
alien. You could also excavate Montana, discover the
4

. We could know that they feel differently than we do without
knowing what it was like to have their felt experiences. Neurophysiology
could tell us that such-and-such biochemical activity in them will
produce some felt experience, but not one that we have ever
experienced.
5
. The example is in this way consistent with the Wittgensteinian
demand that every mental state have an outward criterion. There are
“criteria” by which I can know what the feelings of the aliens are; my
problem is that I am not, and will not be, in a position to know how
those criteria are fulfilled.
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frozen eggs along with the alien’s records, and conclude
that I am an alien. But you have done none of these
things nor anything similar. You rely on a thin thread of
observable evidence to conclude that you and I are similar
in regard to the feelings aroused in us by the death of a
family member.
The conclusion to draw from this argument is not the
insane one that we cannot know what others feel. No one
in their right mind denies that the observable evidence
that we do in fact have is in many cases sufficient for us
to know that others feel as we do. The conclusion to draw
is that being unable to rule out the alien twins possibility
does not defeat your knowledge claim in the way “How do
you know it is not animal B?” defeats your claim to know
that the animal was an A. What explains this difference?
The puzzle is to find an adequate answer.
The explanation I suggest is that we should not regard
“Others are human beings similar to me in feeling” as a
routine empirical hypotheses like “The animal in the forest
is an A.” We should see it as an unshakable tenet of the
conceptual framework within which we formulate and
evaluate routine empirical hypotheses. It is unshakable in
the sense that, although we can easily describe
possibilities like the alien twin possibility, we cannot
describe a scenario which makes us conclude, “Yes, now I
really do see that this possibility is something I must
address whenever I claim to know how another feels.”
Instead, we just blithely continue to assume that others
are similarly-feeling human beings. The crucial task is to
explain the unshakability of the assumption in a way that
reveals why we are justified in thinking it true without
making its justification a matter of confirmation by
observable evidence in the same way we confirm that
“The animal is an A.”
Without a solution to the “other minds” puzzle, we
lack an adequate understanding of the ultimate basis of
our knowledge that others feel as we do. The hope is not
simply that the solution will remove a pesky puzzle; the
hope is that the solution will yield a satisfying insight into
just how it is that we can know that we feel alike.

II. THE DECEPTION ARGUMENT
The “deception argument” concerns possibilities of
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deceit which are consistent with the assumption that
others are similarly-feeling human beings yet still seem to
show that we cannot know what another feels. I begin
with three examples to illustrate the kind of deceit in
question and also to suggest that it is common.
Love Story: Early in their romance, Derek and
Meredith are watching the movie, Love Story. When the
movie ends, Meredith describes how moved she is and
how she feels, and Derek, looking into her eyes,
deceitfully tells her he feels the same. He is certain that
Meredith will believe him because he knows she assumes
that they are relevantly similar in their felt responses to
romantic-novel-like portrayals of emotional relationships.
Marital infidelity: After several years of marriage, both
Derek and Meredith are having affairs. Each of them is
unaware of the other’s infidelity, and, from time to time,
Derek deceitfully confesses to Meredith his still-felt-afterall-this-time passion for her, and Meredith deceitfully
assures him that she feels the same. They are certain
their respective deceptions will succeed because each
assumes the other, not only still feels passion, but also
assumes that the feeling is mutual.
Negotiation: Edwards and Gorski are negotiating the
establishment of an IBM office in Krakow, Poland. To make
the negotiations go smoothly, Edwards has taken every
opportunity to indicate that, across a wide range of
business and social matters, she and Gorski feel the
same. Edwards has not been concerned with whether her
claims in this regard are true; she is willing to deceive to
ensure that Gorski sees her as a person who feels as he
does. Gorski notices their apparent agreement in feeling,
and soon concludes that she feels as he does.
I offer a “possibility of deception” argument, which
parallels the alien twin argument. The argument is that
the possibility of deception shows that, in many cases at
least, we do not know that others feel as we do. To begin
the argument, imagine yourself in the grandmother’s
death/sense of loss example. You know me well; you have
observed my behavior with great care after the death of
my grandmother. You believe that, if you have ever
known anything at all, you know that I feel a sense of loss
similar to that which you feel. Even so, the possibility of
deceit appears to defeat your knowledge claim. How, for
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example, do you show that the following is not the case? I
do not feel a sense of loss; what I experience is the
absence of any such feeling; however, I pretend to feel a
sense of loss. Doing so is easier than explaining what is
really going on with me; consequently, you are mistaken
when you infer that I feel as you do on the basis of my
behavior and the assumption that you and I are relevantly
similar in our felt responses to death.6
The claim is not that it is impossible for you to rule out
this possibility. You could, for example, hack into the diary
that I keep on my computer and read my confession that I
feel nothing; or, you could use hi-tech surveillance
equipment to eavesdrop on what I assume is the secret,
Shakespearean-style soliloquy in which discuss out loud
with myself my lack of grief. The point is that you have
done nothing of the sort; you have just briefly observed
my behavior. In such case, the totality of your evidence
cannot decide between two hypotheses: that I really feel a
sense of loss; or, that I am just pretending; hence it is as
likely that I am pretending as it is that I feel a sense of
loss. Thus, it appears to follow that you do not know that
you and I are relevantly similar, and hence that you do
not know whether what you feel is what I feel. In general,
when we think others feel as we do, the basis for our
conviction is typically a slim thread of observable
evidence, a thread consistent with those who simply
pretend to feel what they seem to feel.
As before, we should not draw the insane conclusion
that we do not know what others feel. We should conclude
that being unable to rule out the possibility of deceit does
not defeat your knowledge claim in the way “How do you
know it is not animal B?” defeats your claim to know the
animal was an A. The question again is: What explains this
difference? The answer cannot be the same as the
suggested answer in the “other minds” case. The
6

. Is your conclusion defensible on the ground that it is difficult to
maintain a consistent false façade over any extended period of time
and therefore even a relatively short period of observation is sufficient
to rule out pretense? The problem is that it is simply false that
consistent deceit is too difficult to maintain for an extended period of
time. Spies and undercover agents successfully deceive consistently
over extended periods of time. The testimony of literature is the same.
Two examples: Iago’s systematic deceit is the central theme of Othello;
the arch manipulator Julian King in Iris Murdoch’s novel, A Fairly
Honorable Defeat pretends with easy success throughout the novel.
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suggestion was to see “Others are human beings similar
to me in feeling” as an unshakable tenet of the conceptual
framework within which we formulate and evaluate
routine empirical hypotheses. This will not do in the case
of the second puzzle because it does not deny that others
are similar-feeling human beings. The puzzle simply
imagines that other similarly-feeling human beings
deceive us. Of course, the answer could be—and most
likely is—that some sort of assumption of nondeceitfulness is itself an unshakable tenet of our
conceptual framework. We all do indeed assume some
degree of relevant non-deceptiveness on the part of some
smaller or larger circle of intimates, friends, and acquaintances. The question is how to justify such an assumption.
“On the basis of experience” will not do since that simply
assumes that in the past one was able to know that one
was not deceived. What we want to know is precisely how
one qualifies as knowing in the face of the possibility of
deception. A satisfactory answer would illuminate the
nature of our relation to others. I will not, however, pursue
this question any further.

III. OVER-GENERALIZATION
The final argument concerns possibilities which are
consistent with the assumption that others do not as a
rule deceive us but which still seem to show that we
cannot know that others feel as we do. This time the
possibilities involve over-generalization. When we infer
that others feel as we do, our inference rests on the
generalization that their feelings are similar to ours. When
we over-generalize, we think we know how others feel
when in fact we do not.
For an example of over-generalization, imagine that
the twenty-year-old Mason reads Crime and Punishment
for his Russian literature course; in his essay on the book,
he considers the standard (and correct) claim that,
through Roskolnikov, Dostoyevsky intends to demonstrate
that the notions of sin, guilt, confession, and redemption
through suffering still apply, even to those without
religious faith. Mason does not deny that this was
Dostoyevsky’s intention, but he argues that, once
Roskolnikov confesses to the murder of the old woman, all
Dostoyevsky succeeds in portraying is a broken man
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without the courage of his convictions. Mason feels
disdain for Roskolnikov and a lack of respect for
Dostoyevsky. When Mason’s father mentions that he
recently reread Crime and Punishment, Mason assumes
his father feels the same way. Mason is wrong. When his
father read the novel in his twenties, his reactions were
the same as his son’s, but, at fifty and no stranger to what
he would be willing to label “sin” and “guilt,” he sees
confessing Roskolnikov as having the courage to take a
necessary first step toward redemption, and he feels
respect for both Roskolnikov and Dostoyevsky. Mason
over-generalizes. He thinks his father is relevantly like
him, when he is not.
When we claim to know that another feels as we do,
how do we know we are not over-generalizing? I am not
claiming that we can never know that we are not overgeneralizing. In the wrenching-sense-of-loss example, for
instance, you may know me well enough to know for
certain that my grandmother’s death will make me feel as
your grandmother’s death would make you feel. My
concern is with the cases where we know the other less
well. Imagine, by way of illustration, a law professor trying
to help an academically struggling student. When the
professor learns the student has been dismissed from law
school for poor academic performance, the professor
imagines the student receiving the dismissal letter.
Imaginatively projecting himself into the student’s plight,
the professor feels disappointment, chagrin, worry, and he
infers the student feels the same. He makes the inference
because he assumes the student’s real reactions will be
relevantly similar his imagined ones. The assumption is
reasonable. Concerned about the student, the professor
perceives a pressing need to come to some conclusion
about how the student will react. What resources does he
have at his disposal to predict the student’s reaction? It is
not as if he can consult the Comprehensive Manual of
Human Felt Reactions Categorized by Personality Type
and Circumstance, and he may never have seen the
student react in any similar situation before. All he has to
fall back on is trying to feel as the student will feel. In
general, we must, for the most part, see others as like
ourselves in order to predict how they will feel, and, where
the need to predict is sufficiently pressing, we are not
unreasonable to so. Unfortunately, the unanimous
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testimony of common experience, history, literature, and
psychology is that people tend to see others more like
themselves than the others really are; consequently,
when we think we are painting a portrait of how another
feels, we may only be producing a picture of the bars of
the cage of our own limited experience.
This is the professor’s fate. The student’s reaction is
blind rage, which leads him to make a formal complaint of
unfair treatment with the Dean of Students. Such
possibilities of over-generalization would seem to show
that a large number of cases we only think we know how
others feel. Thus: suppose that, in the wrenching-senseof-loss example, you do not know me that well; I am a
distant relative you have just met at the funeral. You
watch me as I quietly stare into my grandmother’s open
grave; imagining how I must feel, you are suddenly
gripped by a wrenching sense of loss, and, assuming we
are relevantly similar in our felt responses to death, you
infer that I must be feeling the same way. Given the
totality of your observable evidence, two hypotheses are
equally likely: you are not over-generalizing and we are
relevantly similar; or, you are over-generalizing and we
are not relevantly similar. Since the totality of your
evidence leaves these hypotheses equally likely, you do
not know that I feel what you feel. The argument applies
whenever the totality of one’s observable evidence is
insufficient to decide between the two hypotheses of
accurate generalization versus over-generalization.
The answer to this argument is simply to accept it.
The possibility of over-generalization does show that we
fail to know when the underlying generalization rests on
insufficient observable evidence. We—often–only think
that we know that others feel as we do. “Often” because,
like the law professor concerned about the student, we
often perceive a need to predict how others will feel, and,
often, all we have to go on is our own felt reactions to
imagined situations. We inevitably use them as the basis
on which to predict how others will feel. Consequently, we
often routinely adopt this strategy when have only slim
evidence for the generalization that our felt reactions are
the same as the reactions of others. We inevitably overgeneralize.
One might respond, “So what? I predict how others
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feel on the basis of what I would feel. When it works, it
works. When it does not, I correct my assumptions. What
does it matter than I do not know as long as I have a
reasonable strategy to follow to predict how others feel?”
The problem is with the “When it works, it works.” We
may not know when it “works.” Mason, and the law
professor, for example, may never know whether their
prediction “worked” unless the others about whom they
made their predictions reveal whether the prediction was
accurate. Unless we communicate, we are very unlikely to
learn whether our claims are right or wrong. Unless his
father tells him, Mason may never learn that his view of
his father is wrong; the same holds for the law professor,
who may never talk to the dismissed-from-law-school
student again. Where there is no communication, to say:
“When it works, it works” is like shooting at a target you
cannot see and saying, “When I hit it, I hit it, and when I
miss, I adjust my aim.” Since you do not know when you
hit it, you do not know when or how to adjust your aim.
Knowing how another feels is the same: often we think we
are painting a portrait of another’s feelings when we are
really just producing yet one more rendition of the bars of
our cage.
One may object that I am too strongly discounting the
possibility that others will simply tell us how they feel.
After all, Mason’s father might learn of his son’s mistaken
belief and might correct it by telling him that he feels
respect, not disdain, for Roskolnikov and Dostoyevsky.
Mason can then revise his erroneous assumption that he
and his father have similar felt responses. Similarly, the
law professor could seek out the student, and the
Canadian Prime Minister could ask the homeless to
describe their disappointment. Even if attempting to
empathize is sometimes like shooting at a target you
cannot see, we can still investigate the target to see if we
did in fact hit it. This reply is inadequate. When Mason’s
father tells him that he feels respect, what Mason learns
about his father is similar to what the Prime Minister
knows about the skid row residents. She knows that their
feelings
fall
under
the
general
category
of
disappointment; similarly, Mason learns that his father’s
feelings fall under the general category of respect. Neither
knows, solely on that basis, the specific quality of the
others’ felt experiences. The objection is that being told
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that someone’s feelings are of a certain general sort can
help one know their specific felt quality. Of course, once
Mason’s father tells him that he feels respect, not disdain.
Mason can attempt to imaginatively project himself in his
father’s state of mind and thereby feel as his father does.
Now, he can only correctly infer that the feelings he
experiences are the same as his father’s feelings if he
correctly assumes that his imaginatively projected self is
similar in feeling to his father. However, if his father has
given him sufficient indication of why he feels respect for
Roskolnikov, Mason may know that his imagined self and
his father share a relevantly similarity of feeling. Or he
may not. He may fail in this attempt to imaginatively
project himself in his father’s state of mind. It takes
considerable imaginative ability to succeed in such a
project; nonetheless, on occasion, our imaginations can
release us from our cages.

IV. EMPATHY AND COMPASSION
When we succeed in empathizing, understanding and
tolerance may result. Consider a simple example. Brianna
is an experienced and accomplished public speaker; Brian,
on the other hand, has to give the first public presentation
of his life. Initially, Brianna is irritated at Brian’s constant
agonizing over the presentation; she thinks he should, at
his age, be able to pull himself together instead of boiling
over with anxiety. Eventually, however, Brianna
remembers what it was like for her before her first
presentation. Imaginatively projecting herself into Brian’s
state of mind makes Brianna not only tolerant, but even
solicitous and supportive.
Two further points bear emphasis. The first is that
tolerance is important. Despite its obviousness, the
importance
of
tolerance
bears
emphasis.
Our
disagreements are all too often sharp and fundamental
and equally too resistant to rational resolution. As John
Rawls notes:
[L]ong historical experience suggests, and many plausible
reflections confirm, that . . . reasoned and uncoerced
agreement are not to be expected. . . . Our individual and
associative points of view, intellectual affinities and affective
attachments, are too diverse, especially in a free democratic
society, to allow of lasting and reasoned agreement. Many
conceptions of the world can plausibly be constructed from
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different standpoints. Diversity naturally arises from our limited
powers and distinct perspectives; it is unrealistic to suppose
that all our differences are rooted solely in ignorance and
perversity, or else in the rivalries that result from scarcity. . . .
[The appropriate view of social organization] takes deep and
unresolvable differences on matters of fundamental significance
as a permanent condition of human life.7

Tolerance of differences in “associative points of view,
intellectual affinities and affective attachments” serve to
prevent “deep and unresolvable differences on matters of
fundamental significance” from unacceptably disrupting
social and political life.
The second point: we often fail to empathize, which
can lead to intolerance. Consider the following variant of
the Brianna/Brian example. Brianna hardly knows her new
co-worker, Brian, and his obvious anxiety over his
upcoming public presentation annoys her. If she were that
anxious, it would be the outward manifestation of a
complete emotional meltdown, and she cannot tolerate
such a weak co-worker. Eventually, however, she realizes
that she hardly knows Brian and that his anxiousness may
not mean in his case what it would mean in hers. To avoid
condemning him on inadequate evidence, Brianna decides
to tolerate Brian and even help him. Where “deep and
unresolvable differences on matters of fundamental
significance” are the rule, and genuine empathy is a
difficult achievement, tolerance based on the recognition
that we have failed to empathize is critical. It is, of course,
utopian to expect this. It should happen, but it will not.
People too often adhere too passionately to their own
“associative points of view, intellectual affinities and
affective attachments” to realize, first, that another’s felt
experience can make that persons point of view as
compelling as their own, and, second, that they may not
have any clear idea of what the other’s felt experience is
like.
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